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Divine Command Theory in Early Franciscan Thought: 
A Response to the Autonomy Objection 
 
Abstract: In recent years, many scholars have bemoaned the gradual demise of 
traditional virtue ethics, and its eventual replacement in the later Middle Ages by divine 
command theory. Where virtue ethics nurtures a capacity for spontaneous moral 
judgment, this theory turns on adherence to ordained duties and laws. Thus, virtue 
ethicists among others have tended to object to the theory on the grounds that it 
undermines the role of the moral agent in moral adjudication. In this paper, by contrast, I 
will argue that there is a way of construing divine command theory, which is not 
susceptible to this critique. To this end, I will turn to the work of first-generation 
Franciscan scholars, who affirmed the necessity of human understanding of divine 
commands and the complete freedom of the will to observe them. 
 
Keywords: Divine Command Theory, Virtue Ethics, Thomas Aquinas, Franciscans, 
Gospel, Faith, Natural Law, Eternal Law, Mosaic Law 
 
 In recent years, many scholars – and Alasdair MacIntyre most famously – have 
bemoaned the gradual demise and eventual obliteration of the traditional ethic of virtue 
which prevailed in some form for much of the pre-modern period.1 This ethic assists 
adherents in cultivating a personal moral disposition that makes it possible to act 
virtuously in a wide range of unpredictable circumstances. As recent research has shown, 
virtue ethics was quickly supplanted in the later middle ages by an alternative, namely, 
divine command theory, which received mature formulation in the work of thirteenth-
century Franciscan scholars such as William of Ockham.2  
As the name suggests, divine command theory turns on adherence to divinely-
ordained duties and laws, where virtue ethics nurtures a capacity for spontaneous moral 
judgment. After gaining considerable momentum in the early modern period, a 
counterpart to this theory eventually emerged in the secular context in the form of 
deontology or duty ethics. In spite of its popularity, divine command theory has often 
been debated and subjected to diverse critiques. One of the most persistent critiques to be 
mounted against the theory, especially from the camp of virtue ethicists, concerns its 
apparent failure to affirm the role of the moral agent in moral adjudication.  
According to many versions of divine command theory, after all, morality is 
mainly a matter of following arbitrary regulations, which are based on an unknown 
rationale and must therefore be accepted on blind faith, absent an element of personal 
decision or desire. Although this so-called ‘autonomy objection’3 has been described by 
some as fatal for divine command theory, insofar as it queries the agency of the moral 
agent, I will endeavor in this paper to elucidate a way of construing the theory which is 
not susceptible to this critique. To this end, I will turn to what may seem at face value 
like the most unlikely of sources, namely, the work of first-generation Franciscan 
scholars, who flourished nearly a century before Ockham.4 
In keeping with the tradition they themselves founded, these thinkers regarded 
God’s commands—administered initially through the Mosaic Law and subsequently 
through the Law of the Gospel—as the arbiters of the Christian moral life. As I will 
demonstrate, however, the early Franciscans did not interpret such divine laws or 
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commands as arbitrary rulings. Rather, they described the commands as fully intelligible 
in terms of the natural law that is innately known to all human beings. For such 
Franciscans, this law simultaneously engrains in human minds the eternal law of God that 
is expressed in the Law of Moses and in the Gospel.  
By thus providing the rationale behind the divine commands, the natural law 
leaves no room to doubt that human beings both can and ought to contemplate the 
correctness of a course of action for themselves. Furthermore, it places the onus on the 
moral agent to deliberate and choose of their own accord to obey or disobey God’s 
commands. For these reasons, clearly, the emergence of the problems noted by the 
autonomy objection cannot necessarily be attributed to the triumph of divine command 
theory over virtue ethics. Those problems may simply result from the displacement of a 
cognitively accessible rationale for the law of God in some later divine command theories.  
Granted, early Franciscans offer a very different account of moral agency than 
virtue ethicists—one which involves observing divine commands rather than cultivating 
moral virtues. Nonetheless, they affirm most emphatically the crucial and informed role  
the moral being must play in exercising moral judgment. As such, I would argue, their 
divine command theory represents a viable counterpart to virtue ethics in the field of 
Christian ethics, at least in regard to the question of autonomy. 
In order to make this case, I will assess the tractate on law that can be found in the 
so-called Summa Halensis. Although this Summa is named for Alexander of Hales (c. 
1185-1245), who oversaw its composition, other key Franciscans undoubtedly 
contributed to its completion.5 Indeed, the Summa represents a collaborative effort on the 
part of the early Franciscan school to articulate theological, philosophical, and moral 
principles based upon the vision and values of St Francis of Assisi for the very first time.  
As one of the first great theological syntheses not only of the Franciscan school 
but also of the period more generally, the Summa Halensis was mostly completed 
between 1236-45, just eight years after Francis’ death, and twenty years before Thomas 
Aquinas even set his hand to the task of authoring his own Summa Theologiae. Thus, it 
laid the foundation both for the further development of the Franciscan intellectual 
tradition and for systematic theology as a discipline.6    
Whereas the precise author of different sections of the Summa is sometimes 
difficult to determine, scholarship has succeeded in establishing firmly that John of La 
Rochelle was the author of the treatise on law, large swaths of which simply reproduce 
his personal writings.7 In order to throw the distinctiveness of his Franciscan approach to 
Christian ethics into relief, I will begin with a brief comparison of the Summa’s structure 
and content to the more familiar text of Aquinas’ Summa, which offers the most mature 
and well-known statement of Christian virtue ethics.  
 
The Summa Halensis vs. the Summa Theologiae 
 
Similar to Aquinas’ Summa, the Franciscan Summa, as I will call it, is divided 
into three main parts, where the second part is itself divided into first and second parts. 
However, the similarities between the two texts largely end there. For while Part I of 
Aquinas’ Summa treats God, creation, angels, and humanity, the Franciscan Summa 
deals only with the doctrine of God. Part 2.1 of Aquinas’ Summa discusses the human 
end, acts, passions, habits, vice and sin, law and grace—or matters preliminary to virtue 
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ethics--before dealing with the three theological and four cardinal virtues in Part 2.2. By 
contrast, the Franciscan Summa covers creation, angels, and humanity in Part 2.1 and 
provides an extensive catalogue of types of evil and sin in Part 2.2. The table of contents 
alone for this section alone runs over 25 pages.  
In order to capture the level of detail to which the Summists resort in discussing 
sin, it is worth rehearsing some of the principal topics addressed in Part 2.2, which 
contains three main sections, namely, on evil, on sin, and on particular species of sin. The 
latter section contains headings on ‘venial and mortal sins’, ‘sins of omission and 
commission’, sins of the heart, speech, and action’, ‘the seven capital vices’, ‘sins of 
infirmity, ignorance, and purpose’, ‘sins of fear and love’, ‘the sin of concupiscence’, and 
‘sins against God, neighbours, and the self’. In these sections, the Summists provide a 
lengthy catalogue of sins, which is to my knowledge unmatched in literature from this 
period.8 Aquinas’ brief segment on ‘vice and sin’ in his own Summa is certainly no 
comparison. 
In Part 3 of the Summa Theologiae, finally, Aquinas covers the Incarnation and 
sacraments, whereas the Franciscan Summa describes the Incarnation, the divine laws 
that are designed to counteract sin—and their fulfilment in the gospel—as well as grace 
and faith. Though there are many more differences between the two texts than the basic 
ones mentioned above, even these are striking and clearly testify to very different 
theological and moral perspectives and priorities. As scholars have observed, for instance, 
Aquinas devoted an extraordinary level of attention to his discussion of moral virtue, 
giving it a more central place in his theological scheme than any thinker prior to this time, 
with two whole parts of his four-part work covering matters preliminary to virtue ethics 
and the virtues themselves, respectively.9 
By contrast, the early Franciscans commit a seemingly disproportionate amount 
of space to the extremely detailed enumeration of both human sins and the divine laws 
that have been administered to curb them. In this regard, they certainly were not alone. 
Many scholars of the period devoted considerable attention to the Ten Commandments, 
particularly after the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 declared knowledge of the 
Decalogue, along with the creed and the Pater Noster, essential for all Christian persons, 
as part of a larger effort to reform both morals and orthodox beliefs which were being 
compromised at the time. In the wake of this development, a wave of literature on the 
Decalogue was produced, not least as a basis for preparing sermons.1  
Nevertheless, John’s treatment, and that of his Franciscan contemporaries, is too 
extensive to be considered unexceptionable.10 Thus, one might suppose that the 
Franciscans had particular reasons, to do with their unique ethos as a religious order, for 
emphasizing divine commands, reasons which space does not permit us to explore here. 
On account of this emphasis, the reader is hard pressed to find many references to the 
cardinal moral virtues, and discussion of the theological virtues is sparse and far from 
central. The only exception in this regard is the virtue of faith, which receives detailed 
coverage in a Part 3 treatise on ‘grace and faith’, which follows the treatise on divine 
laws—and in specific, the Ten Commandments and their relationship to the Gospel—and 
which closes the whole of the Summa Halensis. 
For his part, in contrast, I have mentioned that Aquinas addressed the questions of 
grace and faith at the end and at the beginning of his Parts 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, 
covering the Old and New Laws only cursorily prior to his discussion of grace. Although 
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Aquinas treats some of the same key theological topics as the Summists, such as grace, 
faith, and the law, consequently, the context in and extent to which he does so speaks 
volumes regarding the theological differences between them. As I have noted, Aquinas 
treats law and grace at the end of a section on preliminary matters pertaining to moral 
virtue. In his account, therefore, the law—whether divine or natural—is not incompatible 
with virtue. On the contrary, the law requires that human beings strive for the highest 
good, or what is best, and thus bear their lives and resources to the best of their abilities. 
Yet that is precisely what the virtues he subsequently discusses apparently make it 
possible to do.11 
When he discusses the Old (Mosaic) Law explicitly, Aquinas goes so far as to 
state that the whole purpose of that Law was to prescribe and make it possible to exhibit 
moral virtue.12 As the grace dispensed through Christ now performs this function, at least 
in those who receive grace through faith, working through the other theological virtues of 
hope and love, that law is no longer needed. That is not to say that it has been abolished. 
On this score, Aquinas notes that the Law of the Gospel contains the Old Law, precisely 
because it nurtures automatically the virtues that inhibit the transgression of the Law.13 
For that very reason, however, he concludes that the Old Law has been rendered obsolete 
in practice, even though it remains theoretically valid.  
For the Franciscan Summists, by contrast, law, grace, and faith are not 
preliminaries or conditions for the possibility of moral virtue, as they are for Aquinas. 
Rather, the law represents the whole substance of early Franciscan moral theology, where 
grace and faith respectively represent the divine and human contributions that render the 
fulfilment of the law possible. Thus, grace performs a very different function in 
Franciscan thought than it does in that of Aquinas. In his work, I have hinted, grace sets 
us up to the fulfil the law—which is simply to do whatever is morally appropriate in the 
circumstances.  
Because the circumstances vary radically depending on who is acting, towards 
whom, when, why, where, and how, and what the relevant action entails, however, 
determining how to act rightly in various circumstances requires spontaneous judgement 
and thus a remarkable level of adaptability, which is made possible by moral virtue.14 
Whatever the value of human laws and duties—which Aquinas by no means 
foreswears—they are no substitute for the necessary involvement of the moral agent who 
must decide what laws or rules even apply in any given case, and that agent’s will to act 
according to duty. In that sense, the grace that supports the faith that enacts the 
theological virtues, which motivate moral virtue in ideal circumstances, is bound to have 
quite diverse and even highly individual ramifications.  
Indeed, grace is operative anywhere anyone operates in the best interests of 
themselves and others. Thus, it is active variously depending on who is acting and what 
action is involved. For the early Franciscans, by contrast, the function of grace is 
univocal: grace makes it possible for those with faith to fulfil the Mosaic Law. Where 
Aquinas spent hundreds of pages discussing the virtues, consequently, the early 
Franciscan Summists designate a 500-page section of their Summa to commenting on the 
nature and implications of the Mosaic Law. Thus it remains to examine more closely the 
Franciscan account of this Law, its fulfilment by the Gospel, its relationship to eternal 
and natural law, and ultimately, to the faith that is enlivened by grace.  
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Mosaic Law and the Law of the Gospel in the Summa Halensis 
 
In keeping with biblical and historical tradition, John of La Rochelle recognized 
three components of the Mosaic Law, as outlined in the Torah: the judicial and 
ceremonial precepts and the moral precepts provided in the Ten Commandments. Over 
half of John’s section on the Mosaic Law is devoted to considering these Commandments, 
which are themselves spread across two tablets. In accordance with a longstanding 
tradition of dividing the commands which traces to Augustine, the first three 
commandments belong on the first tablet and order the human soul to God, while the 
latter seven are listed on the second and order inter-personal relations.15  
On John’s argument, the ‘ceremonial precepts depend on the mandates of the first 
tablet, which were all given to enable the worship of God and to keep human beings from 
idolatry’16, whereas the judicial precepts were given ‘for the purpose of preserving peace 
with others, and thus depend on the moral principles of the second tablet’.17 As John 
observes, however, these precepts are no longer necessary after Christ, who has provided 
conclusive justification for sin, that is, the failure to observe God’s law, for which the 
ceremonial and judicial laws formerly provided merely provisional compensation.18 
While it would be interesting to evaluate John’s account of each divine command 
in detail, that inquiry would take us far beyond the scope of the present project. In this 
regard, it suffices to note that where preceding thinkers—following Origen—had tended 
to interpret the Decalogue exclusively in terms of what medieval thinkers described as 
the ‘spiritual sense’ of the text, that is, with regard to its allegorical, moral, or 
eschatological implications, John worked under the influence of an earlier contemporary, 
William of Auxerre (d. 1231), who had insisted on a completely literal reading of the 
commands.  
Although ‘William’s analysis was too unusual to be wholly accepted, it was 
influential for both John of La Rochelle and Thomas Aquinas. John could not agree that 
every precept had a literal meaning, but he was prepared to admit that most of them did, 
and all were certainly comprehensible and thus observable in a spiritual sense.’19 The 
combination of a literal and spiritual reading of the Commands presumably made it 
possible theoretically to counteract all the specific sins enumerated in Part 2.1 of the 
Summa. Thus, it remains to consider how early Franciscans like John perceived the role 
of those laws in combatting sin in the current dispensation, that is, in an order which is 
privy to the revelation of the Incarnate Son. 
Needless to say, both Scripture and the Christian tradition teach that the Law of 
Moses was not abolished but fulfilled by the Gospel of Christ.20 Yet there are different 
ways of understanding what this teaching means. In Reformation theology particularly, 
the debate about the relationship between the Law and the Gospel became a matter of 
some significance. Following John Calvin, the Reformed tradition has tended to 
acknowledge three uses of the Law.21 The first is the political or civil use, in which the 
Law is regarded as the means by which God has generally revealed principles by which 
believing as well as unbelieving individuals should live. The second is the pedagogical 
use, in which the Law makes us aware of our transgressions and points us to Christ. The 
third is the didactic use, exclusively reserved for believers, whereby the Law continues to 
instruct us in the way we should live, even though it cannot condemn us any longer.  
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Whereas the Lutheran tradition generally affirms the first two uses of the Law, 
many strands of this tradition have perceived the danger of a ‘works-based’ salvation 
lurking in the so-called ‘third use of the law’. The Catholic tradition, as represented by 
Aquinas, certainly acknowledges the significance of the Decalogue and assumes a literal 
reading of it as the basis for moral theology.22 Yet it moves relatively quickly from this 
foundation to a spiritual reading of the commandments as means of cultivating the 
theological and moral virtues.23 Thus, there is disagreement when it comes to determining 
what it means to affirm that the Law is fulfilled, though not completely abolished, by the 
Gospel, and it is vital in any instance to investigate how exactly a particular school of 
thought construes the relationship between the two.  
The early Franciscan focus on divine commands gives us reason to believe that 
the Gospel in this context is interpreted as that which literally enables believers to fulfil 
those commands in all their specificity, and thus to avoid committing any of a long list of 
sins. In Franciscan thought, in other words, there is already something like a ‘third use of 
the Law’. This claim is actually made explicitly in the very first chapter of the treatise on 
Mosaic Law, which considers ‘the uses of the law’.24 There, John writes that ‘the law of 
Moses functions according to three reasons, by divine dispensation’.25 
First, the law was given in support of the natural law. Because there are seeds of 
justice in human nature, he elaborates, the Law was added by divine mercy, such that by 
its authority and teaching, the natural human proficiency for justice might bear fruit in 
just acts. In that sense, he argues, the natural law is included in the law of Moses, which 
renders that law explicit. Secondly, the law was given to restrain sin. In other words, it 
was given to teach humanity what sin is and to deter us from it. Thirdly, the law was 
given in anticipation (ad figurandam) of the law of grace and to direct us towards it: it 
served as a sign of what it signified.26 
In that sense, John contends, the moral content of the law does not differ from that 
of the gospel. That is to say, the Law of the Gospel does not add new precepts to the 
Decalogue.27 It only secures the justification that comes from obeying the Ten 
Commandments in a different way, namely, through Christ rather than through the 
observance of ceremonial and judicial precepts. Thus, the law of Moses is included in the 
Gospel just as fully as—we will see—the natural law is included in the Law of Moses 
itself.  
This point is further substantiated in the Summa’s treatise on ‘The Law of the 
Gospel’ (de lege evangelica), which follows the treatise on Mosaic Law. In this context, 
John makes his view of the relationship between the two laws manifestly clear in 
bolstering the contention that the ‘law of the gospel and the law of Moses are one law in 
terms of their universal reason and diverse only in terms of their proper reasons’.28 As he 
goes on to explain, a universal or common reason can either pertain to the source/cause or 
goal/end or to the sense of the law. The source is the same in the case of both laws 
because ‘one God is the universal legislator of both the law and the gospel’.  
Moreover, the end of both laws is the same, namely, Christ, who perfects rather 
than destroys the law (finis perficiens, non interficiens) in the sense that he makes it 
possible actually to do those things the law imposes a duty to do.29 Finally, the laws share 
a single sense because there is one universal truth, which, while expressed differently at 
different times, carries the same connotations.30 Nevertheless, the Summist acknowledges 
that the two laws differ in these three respects in terms of their proper reasons. As regards 
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its source, for instance, the Mosaic law was given purely through humankind, while the 
gospel came through Christ.31 With respect to ends, the Law serves to deter us from evil 
through fear, while the gospel motivates us to do good through love.32 As regards senses, 
the laws differ in that the first is true in form, and the gospel is true in substance, and this 
insofar as it is ordered to the form.33  
On these grounds, the Summist sums up that the law of Moses and of the Gospel 
are one law in universal terms, and only differ in specific terms because the former was 
given to carnal people, the latter to spiritual ones, the former to children, and the latter to 
the mature.34 Since these ‘proper’ differences do not make for a substantial difference 
between the two laws, however, those laws do not differ as contraries but only as entities 
which cannot be compared in terms of their proper reasons.35 In order to understand why 
this is so, we must turn to John’s writings on the eternal and divine law, which precede 
the treatises on Mosaic law and the gospel.  
 
Eternal and Natural Law in the Summa Halensis 
 
As recent scholarship has established, John of La Rochelle was the first 
theologian systematically to develop an account of the eternal law that exists above our 
minds, in the mind of God, for which he nonetheless drew inspiration from Augustine.36 
According to John, this law is impressed upon our souls;37 and ‘is that by which all things 
are ultimately ordained towards what is just.’38 Thus, both the Mosaic Law and the 
natural law are derived from the eternal law. 39 In order to define the content, as it were, 
of the eternal law, consequently, John turns first to consider the natural law, to which the 
Mosaic Law gives a privileged and complete expression.  
In treating this topic, he initially inquires whether the natural law pertains 
primarily to reason or to the will. In answering this question, he states that the natural law 
is ‘that by which anyone understands and is conscious in themselves as to what is good 
and what is bad.’40 Thus, it seems at first glance to pertain primarily to reason. Since 
consciousness implies a habit, which is generally called a habit of the will’, however, 
John concludes that the application of the natural law is not simply an act of reason but 
also a habit of the will. In elaborating on this contention, he writes that an act of reason 
proceeds from and thus presupposes the substance of an innate operation.  
For example, ‘to shine’ is innate to the substance of the sun, even though shining 
or illuminating the world is itself a further operation, to which the substance of the sun 
cannot be altogether reduced. Similarly, he writes, the natural law is that which shines in 
reason. As such, it is in the will as an aptitude or habit to operate for the good. 41 However, 
the aptitude must still be employed in operation. On this basis, John concludes that three 
components make up liberum arbitrium or the capacity for free choice, namely, reason 
(ratio), will (voluntas), and activity (facultas) in keeping with reason, which decides what 
to do, and the will, which provides the motivation to do it.42 
From this point, he turns to consider whether the natural law is the same as the 
conscience or what scholastics called ‘synderesis’.43 As noted above, the natural law is 
that which prescribes good and forbids evil. Though the conscience is formed by that law 
and regulates reason thereby, it can choose nonetheless to ignore or refuse to accept the 
judgments of the law. As such, it may vacillate between good and evil in a way that the 
natural law itself cannot do. In this regard, the purpose of synderesis, the so-called ‘spark 
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(scintilla) of the conscience’, is to regulate the will, instigating it to do good. 
Nevertheless, the will may lose its connection with synderesis on account of inordinate, 
sinful desires. As a result, the conscience may become unreceptive to the natural law. For 
these reasons, neither conscience nor synderesis can be equated with that law itself.  
 Although the mind may lose touch with the natural law on account of a failure of 
the will, John further insists that the natural law itself can never be obliterated. It is 
permanently engraved on human reason, because it constitutes the image of God in 
human beings. On John’s account, that image cannot be lost under any circumstances, 
since that would imply a defect in God’s ability to make himself known to humanity, and 
thus a defect in God himself. For this reason, the intellectual power to apply the natural 
law always remains in principle. Likewise, the law itself does not change, although the 
circumstances in which it is applied may differ.44 To suggest otherwise would again 
imply some defect in God and the law he prescribes.  
 As already noted, however, the ability to adhere to the natural law may be 
destroyed in practice when the will becomes preoccupied with earthly objects of affection 
and pursues those instead of seeking to fulfil the natural law.45 When sin takes hold of the 
will in this way, we have seen, access to the law of reason is temporarily suspended. It 
becomes accessible only when the human will commits once more to conforming to the 
will of God;46 that is, to doing what God commands, as he commands.47  
In this connection, John further argues that the natural law does not merely order 
our actions in natural circumstances, as Aquinas believed.48 It also, and indeed, firstly, 
ordains us to God. For John, in fact, it is because human beings are made in the image 
and likeness of God that they have this:  
 
law by which they understand and are conscious in themselves of what is good 
and what is evil. For insofar as human beings are in the image of God, they have a 
cognition of the first truth, namely, God, because the image pertains to a power of 
knowing. But from the fact that human beings are in the likeness of God, they 
have the potential and also the duty to love the supreme good, because the 
likeness refers to the potential to love, and therefore, the law entails that human 
beings are ordained through itself to God and also to neighbours.49  
  
 On this showing, consequently, it is nature rather than grace, which teaches us 
that we are subjected to our Creator and should perform good works in his honor.50 In 
that sense, the natural law strictly speaking impresses the eternal law upon our hearts.51 
‘It insinuates that we should love God above all things and above the self and through the 
self, and instigates us to do so, though not by causing or inducing us.’52 Since the natural 
law became unable to instigate the conscience to love God on account of sin, however, 
the Law of Moses was introduced to do so, and grace was ultimately supplied to induce 
us actually to follow that law. This grace is received through faith, in the manner 
discussed below.  
 
Faith in the Summa Halensis 
 
The concept of faith that is often associated with later Franciscan thinkers at least 
is a strongly voluntarist one, according to which faith in God entails a ‘leap’ on the part 
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of the will, which is not based on grounds or reasons. In the early Franciscan tradition, 
however, faith is attributed to the liberum arbitrium, which entails both reason, will, and 
their co-operation.53 Thus, faith in this tradition is both a matter of what we believe in our 
minds—but do not actually see—and desire or assent to in our hearts. As such, it entails 
both ‘material’ and ‘formal’ components, that is, components which respectively supply 
the substance and enact the possibility of faith. 
 While the material act of faith is to know God, on the Summa’s account, the 
formal act of faith is to assent to love him.54 It is this love that gives us access to the first 
Truth that is impressed upon our minds and that guides the conscience.55 Because it is 
innately impressed upon our minds, the first Truth is the first object of our knowledge 
and is therefore known with utmost certainty. That certainty is only lost when the formal 
element of faith is forfeited by a will that becomes excessively preoccupied with loves 
other than that of God.56 In these circumstances, a super-added grace is needed to restore 
the formal element and thus to reinstate access to the first truth.57  
 In the first instance, consequently, faith on this definition entails a movement on 
the part of the will to obey God’s will as expressed in his commands.58 While a certain 
primacy is therefore attributed to the will, which can make its movement seem blind or 
unfounded, at least initially, this account does not promote voluntarism in the fullest 
sense of the term, because the initial act of the will is ordered towards the restoration of 
an intrinsic human knowledge of the first truth, or God, which provides the rationale 
behind all of his commands.  
 Without a doubt, therefore, there is a cognitive component to the faith that 
motivates obedience to God’s commands. Yet the knowledge at stake here is love’s 
knowledge, which is accessible only to those who have learned properly, and completely 
voluntarily, to order their desires in relation to God. In this light, it comes as no surprise 
that at the very start of the Summa, theology is defined as a ‘practical’ rather than a 
‘theoretical’ science, the primary purpose of which is not to instruct the mind about God 
but to move the affections of the will towards what is good, on account of love for God.59 
Although the principles that have been given to make us good are hidden to us 
because they can only reside in the mind of the transcendent God, the Summist insists in 
this context that they are the most certain of all principles, precisely because they derive 
from an infallible being.60 When we conform ourselves to the God who is love by an act 
of faith which leads us to love him above all else, however, we become disposed to grasp 
the principles that might otherwise appear inscrutable, unfounded, or even arbitrary.61 For 
this reason, the Summist frequently repeats the words of Matthew 5:8: blessed are the 
pure of heart, because they will see God (Mt. 5:8)’.62  
 
The Autonomy Objection Revisited  
 
 In light of the discussion above, we may return to the question whether divine 
command theory undermines the autonomy of individuals to choose their own course of 
moral action and to understand and deliberate about the reasons why they should act. As 
mentioned previously, many critics suppose that autonomy is undermined in this instance 
because an external factor, namely, the will of God, governs our lives, rather than 
personal decisions and choices. Because his will is inscrutable to us, the laws that 
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proceed from it cannot help but appear arbitrary at best and contradictory at worst, in the 
sense that God could in theory command us to do wrong or even to hate him. 
  Although such objections may well apply to other theories regarding the divine 
commands, the early Franciscan account evades them by positing a natural law with 
which God’s commands—and our own actions—must always remain consistent. That is 
not to suggest that God is constrained by the natural law, which orientates all things 
towards what is good or in their best interests. After all, God himself ordained the natural 
law in accordance with his eternal law, which ultimately orders all things towards him as 
the highest good. In this account, consequently, God could never command us to do 
wrong or to hate him, let alone to perform seemingly arbitrary acts, the personal value of 
which is unclear.  
 On the contrary, he commands us only to act for our own benefit, and he gives us 
recourse to an understanding of the relationship between his commands and our interests 
through the innate knowledge of the natural law itself. In the section of the Summa on the 
divine will, the Summist states as much when he inquires whether God can command 
what he does not will or prohibit what he wills. In addressing this question, he 
distinguishes between a will by which one prepares to accomplish an act and a will by 
which one actually accomplishes that act. Though God may test a person’s faith by 
issuing a command to act against his will in the first sense—as, for instance, when he 
asked Abraham to sacrifice his son, Isaac—he never ultimately commands what he does 
not will.63  
The same goes for the natural law, which regulates all things according to the 
highest good. Since this good is simply God, God could not command anything contrary 
to it, namely, himself.64 Nor would he command anything contrary to the Decalogue, 
given that this law flows from the natural law, which ultimately orders creatures not only 
to themselves and others but also to God. Since all things are orientated towards God as 
their end, nothing can be mandated by God which is contrary to the law that emanates 
from him.65 That is not to limit his power, the Summa insists, for it is not consistent with 
divine omnipotence to do anything that would detract from or limit God’s goodness, or 
ours.66 
In summoning us to adhere to the divine commands, consequently, God offers us 
not only understanding of the respects in which obedience is consistent with our well 
being, but also total freedom to obey or disobey his law. Granted, the knowledge of the 
natural law was lost through sin. For this reason, the Law of Moses and ultimately the 
Law of the Gospel had to be introduced, in the first case, to clarify the contours of the 
natural law, and in the second, to reinstate a consistent means of fulfilling it, namely, 
grace. This grace, administered by the Holy Spirit, re-awakens love for God, which is 
expressed in an initial act of faith that is evidenced through obedience to God’s 
commands.  
Though this initial step of faith might seem at first glance to entail acceptance of 
arbitrary divine laws, and thus the deferral of our own powers of deliberation, it soon 
restores our awareness of the natural law as fully expressed in the Law of Moses, thus 
providing access to the principles behind the divine commands. While faith may be blind 
at first, therefore, it ultimately transforms us into initiated moral agents with the inner 
moral disposition to discriminate when and how to follow the divine law, and to do so of 
our own accord. In that sense, the early Franciscan divine command theory clearly 
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establishes moral agency, or the human capacity for spontaneous moral judgment, albeit 
in a way that differs from the tradition of Aquinas. As such, it represents a viable 
foundation for Christian ethics. 
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